Hermeneutics, poetry, and the irony of plato by Foster, Travis
Hermeneutics, Poetry, and the Irony of Plato 
Travis Foster 
Baylor University 
Introduction 
In Book X of Pla to ' s Republic, Socrates considers whether or 
not to exile poetry from the ideal polis. He settles on a provisional 
answer in the affirmative, but he makes the following concession: 
Then we' l l allow its defenders, who aren ' t poets 
themselves but lovers of poetry, to speak in prose 
on its behalf and to show that it not only gives 
pleasure but is beneficial both to the consti tutions 
and to human life. Indeed, we ' l l listen to them 
graciously, for we 'd certainly profit if poetry were 
shown to be not only pleasant but beneficial (X, 
607d-e) . ' 
Tension arises, however , because Plato is himself a poet, an arti-
san with words. How can this tension, almost a contradiction, be 
resolved? In this essay I will take up Socrates ' challenge to con-
struct a philosophical justification for permitt ing poetry, and show 
how poetry does prove beneficial to human life. 2 This explanation 
dissolves the apparent tension in the Republic. In order to con-
struct my defense of poetry, I employ the philosophical he rme-
neutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer , and in particular his investiga-
tions into the truth of art. Gadamer ' s hermeneutical insights un-
veil Platonic epis temology and metaphysics, a l lowing us to see 
Plato not as a writer in conflict with himself, but as a poet ironi-
cally crafting his own work of genius. 
The discussion to follow consists of four sections. The first 
two sections explore the Greek concepts of mimesis and phronesis, 
both of which are central in the works of Plato, Aristot le , and 
Gadamer . The third section examines more closely the relation-
ship between poetry and philosophy, focusing on concepts de -
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scribed in the first two sections and using them to articulate a de -
fense of poetry. I also answer the suggestion that my idiomatic use 
of phronesis unjustifiably conflates the philosophies of Plato and 
Aristotle. The last section is a discussion of Plato himself as a poet 
behind all of his philosophizing, in order to say just how this fact 
plays into his criticisms of poetry and art. 
Part I: Mimesis 
A cursory summarization of Plato 's motivation for exiling poets 
might take the following form. The main problem with poetry, as 
he relates in Book III, is that it simultaneously tends to praise the 
gods and accuse them of bad behavior, including drinking and 
womanizing to excess, and exhibiting behavior that would be de-
structive to the polis if the citizens were to follow these models . 
Plato goes so far as to say that the members of the polis are not to 
believe such things, even in the poetry of the much-es t eemed 
Homer , because such behavior obviously could not be attributed 
to gods worthy of praise and sacrifice. Furthermore, epic heroes 
who are the offspring of the gods should be distanced from human 
failings as well. Socrates concludes that, 
We ' l l compel the poets either to deny that the he -
roes did such things or else deny that they were 
children of the gods. They mustn ' t say both or at-
tempt to persuade our young people that the gods 
bring about evil or that heroes are no better than 
humans. As we said earlier, these things are both 
impious and untrue, for we demonstrated that it is 
impossible for the gods to produce bad things (III, 
391d-e). 
However , this is a superficial reason for the strict regulation of 
poetry in the polis. A deeper problem is that poetry tends to make 
heavy use of mimesis, or imitation. As imitation, poetry is far down 
the ontological/ epistemological dividing line that Plato draws in 
Book VI. Poetry, as art, imitates the things that a craftsman makes , 
which are themselves only imitations of the Forms that the phi-
losopher-king discovers. Plato writes, 
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W e hear some people say that poets know all 
crafts, all human affairs concerned with virtue and 
vice, and all about the gods as well. They say that 
if a good poet produces fine poetry, he must have 
knowledge of the things he writes about, or else 
he wouldn ' t be able to produce it at all. Hence, we 
have to look to see whether those who tell us this 
have encountered these imitators and have been 
so deceived as to realize that their works are the 
third remove from that which is and are easily pro-
duced without knowledge of the t ruth. . . (X, 598d-
599a) . 
Plato asserts that if poets really had knowledge of the things about 
which they wrote and sang, then they would be far more inclined 
to act in ways that would make them the subjects of eulogies rather 
than their authors. In other words, they would act virtuously if 
they knew what virtue was, rather than sing its praises. In this case, 
poets would no longer be poets; they would be phi losopher-kings. 
Hence , Socrates recommends regulating the subject mat ter of po-
ets: they do not know what they are talking about, because they are 
too enmeshed in their own mimesis. 
Yet is Plato against mimesis in all of its forms, against every-
thing that imitates? This conclusion is hardly supported by his 
writ ings. One of Plato 's overriding concerns in the Republic is the 
constitution of the perfect city, because it reflects the human soul 
in harmony. Part of Pla to ' s concern appears in his discussion of 
how the youth of the city should be educated. His pr imary objec-
tive in censoring the subject matter of the poets is to prevent the 
dissemination of false ideas of virtue to impressionable minds . 
Taking this concern as pivotal, one sees that it is not mimesis itself 
that worries Plato, but sophistic textual manipula t ion . As Rod 
Coltman writes, Plato "concerns himself primarily with the moral 
and pedagogical effect of mimetic poetry on the human soul ." 3 
Thus Plato is not so much cautioning against mimesis itself, as he 
is condemning the way it is used, particularly by the Sophists , who 
often resort to citations of epic poets. Texts as infinitely rich as 
those of Homer , for example , are ideal templates for abusive inter-
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pretations that can be used to manipulate others and " m a k e the 
weaker argument appear the stronger." To settle this tension be-
tween mimesis and its effects requires introducing the hermeneu-
tic dimension. This line of inquiry brings us to the phi losophy of 
Gadamer . 
Gadamer dist inguishes between two forms of mimesis: the 
aesthetic and the properly pedagogical.4 The aesthetic mimesis is 
full of passion and stirs up the soul. He calls this " m e r e " imitation, 
and it is this form that Plato warned against in the Republic. The 
properly pedagogical form, however, is more like an invitation. 
When one imitates in this way, one is observing the actions of 
another in order to learn how to perform a certain activity. Ass imi-
lation is involved here, because imitators imitate for the express 
purpose of making the action their own. In such instances they are 
"not subject to and at the mercy of inadvertent and arbitrary mi-
metic influences, but [are themselves] intentionally immersed in 
imitation of that which [they] consciously perceive to be benefi-
cial to [ them], like philosophical dialogue, for example . " 5 A dif-
ference in emphasis and in the role of the audience separates the 
two modes of imitation. Aesthetic mimesis concentrates on what is 
said and demands submission to the text as an authority; such-and-
such is so because the text says that it is so. The audience is there 
to be persuaded, and they are persuaded because they mutually 
recognize the supremacy of the text. Properly pedagogical mime-
sis, however , places emphasis not on what is said or done , but on 
how something is said or done . The audience is treated not as a 
group of judges to be persuaded, but as a class of students willing 
to learn. Thus the text points beyond itself to a future t ime, and to 
future performances by those who learn from it. The aesthetic mode 
is caught in the present, where its effects come to an end once the 
audience has been placed under submission and persuaded. 
If Homer is the poet par excellence (as Plato bel ieved), then 
his oral works can be imitated in two ways. They may be used as 
accounts of the behavior of the gods, their children, and of the 
ancestors of the Greek people. Such imitation (aesthetic) treats the 
epic poems as static historical artifacts, or as fossilized records 
that may be used to influence decisions about everything from law 
to ethics and education. Therefore, aesthetic mimesis treats poems 
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as sources of authority that are used to further the poe t ' s typically 
political ends . 6 The second way to imitate the works of Homer , 
however , involves Homer himself. The poet interacts with Homer , 
with the singers of Homeric poetry that have handed down those 
ancient songs, and with the words that weave those tales of gods 
and heroes. Instead of using Homeric poetry as an authoritative 
history, poets who engage in properly pedagogical mimesis are 
more concerned with their own role in a tradition, the tradition that 
is Homer. When poets imitate in this way, they come to the real-
ization that to be a part of a tradition bears with.it the responsibil-
ity of seeing that tradition survive into the future; hence these po -
ets involve their audience in order to ensure the survival of the 
process that is Homeric poetry. 
Thus , what is wrong with the aesthetic mode of mimesis is that 
it alienates both imitator and audience by calling attention to the 
text as the locus of authority. Both aesthetic and properly peda-
gogical mimesis are actions, not things. However , aesthetic mime-
sis objectifies the action by calling attention to the effects of what 
is done rather than to its affects; that is, the objectification makes 
the text a concrete thing that has the effect of holding power over 
the audience. Properly pedagogical mimesis, however , is gauged 
by how it affects the student that is learning, and how such an 
affected student uses the knowledge that is understood from the 
instruction. Properly pedagogical imitation always involves the in-
teraction of the poet and the audience, or in hermeneutic language, 
of text and interpreter. There is no forgetting of self; indeed, one 
cannot get beyond oneself. 7 
This distinction is crucial, for in defending poets I must dem-
onstrate both that they are able to occasion such an invitation of 
properly pedagogical mimesis and show how they go about it. One 
consequence of failing to differentiate between the two modes of 
mimesis is that philosophers offer near-sighted interpretations of 
Plato that dub him either a "failed poet" or a "pur i tan" who "feared" 
poetry because he feared pleasure, as Iris Murdoch has suggested. 8 
Such Freudian misreadings of Plato miss the point. If the properly 
pedagogical mode of mimesis is, as Coltman describes it, analo-
gous to philosophical dialogue, then poets might not be as differ-
ent from philosopher-kings as Socrates first supposed. 
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In Book VI of the Republic Plato offers his account of the 
good by having Socrates describe it as something like the sun. The 
light that shines forth from the sun might be similar to what we 
would call truth, and objects of knowledge are grasped by the hu-
man soul because of their illumination by the truth radiating from 
the sun. Plato writes: 
Well , understand the soul in the same way: When 
it focuses on something illuminated by truth and 
what is, it understands, knows , and apparent ly 
possesses the unders tanding. . . so that what gives 
truth to the things known and the power to the 
knower is the form of the good. And though it is 
the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an ob-
ject of knowledge (VI, 508d-e). 
Plato also contends that the Forms, or highest objects of knowl-
edge, depend on the one ultimate Form, the Good, for their exist-
ence. Philosopher-kings, whose business it is to know the Forms , 
take a special interest in knowing the Good. After all , their pr ivi-
leged access to the Forms makes them suitable discoverers of what 
virtue is, and arbiters of how the members of the polis are to live 
virtuously. The question then becomes, how do philosopher-kings 
come to understand the Forms, and especially the Form of the Good, 
so that they can discover in what virtue consists . Defending the 
poets requires showing that the philosopher-kings do not in fact 
have sole privileged access to virtue and the Forms. My argument 
at tempts to demonstrate that the poetic and the philosophical ways 
of getting at the truth are not as different as they might seem. First, 
however , I must discuss the use (and relevance) of phronesis by 
the thinkers we are examining. 
Part II: Phronesis 
Plato says that access to the Forms is gained by exercising 
one ' s reason appropriately. As the highest division of the soul, 
reason can be used to understand the Forms through philosophy 
(hence philosophers are the natural candidates for leaders of the 
city). Noesis, or understanding, goes hand in hand with proper rea-
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soning. Taking this fact as a starting point, modern phi losophy has 
attempted to confine such an exercise of reason to a method. T o 
see how Gadamer ' s philosophical hermeneutics addresses the prob-
lems of understanding (while avoiding the standard recourse to 
method) , requires tracing his hermeneutical enterprise back to its 
phenomenological roots. Phenomenology began as the pursuit of 
the right method for grasping the noetic features of objects in an 
effort to get noesis "r ight ." I briefly examine the method suggested 
by Husserl for arriving at such a perfect understanding, and ex-
plain how Gadamer , like Heidegger before him, changed the rules 
of phenomenology so that the pursuit of truth had less to do with 
method and more to do with the Aristotelian notion of phronesis. 
Finally, I show how this Gadamerian idea of understanding based 
on interpretation is closer to what Plato had in mind than others, 
such as Husserl , had thought. 
Husserl began construction of his phenomenological method 
convinced that if he could somehow perfect the way we c o m e to 
understand what something is we would be able to "get it r ight" 
and secure the foundations of the natural sciences. He employed 
the phenomenological reduction, sometimes also called the "e i -
det ic" reduction. Its goal was to get at the eidetic (i.e., universal) 
features of particular experiences. Phenomenology was a method 
crafted to uncover what it was to have an experience of a certain 
something. During the phenomenological reduction, an experience 
is initially had in what Husserl called the "natural at t i tude," or the 
pre-philosophical way of looking at things with our various as-
sumptions of its character and being. Under the reduction, how-
ever, these assumptions and pre-conceived notions of the onto-
logical status of the experience are "bracketed," or set aside, while 
still holding the object of consciousness "in retention." In doing 
so, the phenomenologis t hopes to act intentionally as a transcen-
dental ego , or pure subject that encounters an object of intention-
ality without any ontological commitments . This method of look-
ing at our experience is the way to "get it r ight" because it leaves 
behind all of the contingencies, all of what Gadamer calls the "h i s -
tory of effects" of the subject. Husserlian phenomenology is thus 
often called " t ranscendental" phenomenology. 
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Heidegger had noted that the world often presents us with a 
certain amount of "resistance," or a power to draw us into it and 
prevent the kind of transcendence Husserl had sought. He devoted 
the majority of his early works to shifting the focus of phenom-
enology from the primarily epistemological concerns of transcen-
den ta l p h e n o m e n o l o g y to m o r e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : 
Heidegger wanted to find out what Being is. Being, however , could 
be analyzed only in terms of its occurrence within a world, some-
th ing that He idegge r cal led " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o i i d . " H e i d e g g e r 
brought to the attention of Husserl the fact that being-in-the-world 
could not be ignored if phenomenology was to survive. Gadamer 
notes that as a result of Heidegger ' s influence, "Husserl was able 
to acknowledge being-in-the-world as a problem of the horizon 
intentionality of transcendental consciousness , for the absolute 
historicity of transcendental subjectivity had to he able to demon-
strate the meaning offacticity."l} This "facticity" that had to be 
considered is the entirety of contingent details of one ' s life that 
creep in when doing any transcendental analysis, even Husser l ' s 
phenomenological reduction. Being is always (but not only) factical 
in that it is always already "headed over into a world ." In other 
words , it is always in a particular t ime, moment in history, place, 
and so forth. Gadamer focuses on something perhaps even more 
fundamental: if we are going to talk about the Being of beings at 
all, or any other object of consciousness, then we must realize that 
in doing so what we are really accomplishing is the construction 
of an interpretation. 
G a d a m e r , l ike H e i d e g g e r before h i m , had d o u b t s a b o u t 
Husser l ' s ideas because they tended to neglect life and its "specu-
lative demands . " The Husserlian project, as Gadamer notes, "at-
tempts to derive the constitution of the historical world from ' con-
scious l i fe ' . . . [but] we might ask whether . . . the genuine content of 
the concept of life does not become alienated when it is articulated 
in terms of the epistemological schema: deriving it from the ulti-
mate data of consciousness." 1 " Furthermore, other people are ap-
prehended under the Husserlian method as objects of conscious-
ness , each of whom is only subsequently realized as a " T h o u " 
through empathy. Gadamer thinks that this consequence renders 
the method faulty because the "Thou" must be included in an " im-
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m e d i a t e and pr imary w a y . " " G a d a m e r ' s concern here is that 
Husserl left out crucial factors in describing human understand-
ing, not the least of which is the understanding that arises through 
interaction with a communi ty . When we are constantly trying to 
overcome our historical circumstances and the commitments foisted 
upon us by tradition, we lose sight of the existential d imension of 
life, and we become "al ienated." Gadamer accepts these existen-
tial factors as necessary and does not try to transcend them in an 
effort to reach the "ult imate data of consciousness ." Whi le he criti-
cizes the hermeneutic tradition for its dogged pursuit of its own 
method, he does not give up on truth. 
When Aristotle speaks of phronesis, or ethical knowledge , he 
says that it cannot be taught to the young the same way other sub-
jects can because it is acquired through experience. Young people 
must interact with the world, and in doing so they engage in the 
process of learning what is right and what is wrong. W h y does 
phronesis resist the ability to be taught methodologica l ly? A s 
Col tman points ou t , 1 2 Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics may 
provide a clue: 
What has been said is confirmed by the fact that 
while young men become geometricians and math-
emat ic ians and wise in matters like these, it is 
thought that a young man of practical wisdom 
[phronesis] cannot be found. The cause is that such 
wisdom is concerned not only with universals but 
with particulars, which become familiar from ex-
perience, but a young man has no experience, for 
it is length of t ime that gives expe r i ence . . . 1 3 (VI, 
1142a, 12-16). 
From this passage Aristotle seems to think that ethical knowledge 
cannot be taught in the same way as mathematical formulae be-
cause unlike geometry and mathematics there is no method to the 
learning of ethical Tightness.M Phronesis involves a "non-methodi-
cal deliberative process that is tempered by exper ience" that "does 
not consist in a computational formula that can be applied indis-
criminately to any particular s i tuat ion." 1 5 Gadamer takes this idea 
146 AUSLEGUNG 
as the basis for his resistance to method of philosophical herme-
neutics in Truth and Method, as he sees all interpretation as a kind 
of phronesis. 
Gadamer contrasts ethical knowledge with the ethical sciences 
in an effort to explain why Aristotle wrote the Nicomachean Eth-
ics despite the impossibility of teaching ethical knowledge . As 
Coltman writes, " the ethical sciences, of which Gadamer sees the 
Nicomachean Ethics itself as a prime example , provide only gen-
eral outlines or schemata that may help guide the moral person. 
But, he argues, even the teacher of ethics ' a lways already stands 
within an ethical-political restriction from out of which he acquires 
his image of the matter [die Sache; i.e., the moral idea to be 
a c h i e v e d ] . " 1 6 As an ethical scientist, Aristotle knew that ethical 
k n o w l e d g e w a s no t a b l e to be " c o n f i n e d t o o n e e a s i l y 
circumscribable domain," so he did not bother to work out a method 
with which we clear the way for the "smooth ground of theory" 
that allows for ethical knowledge a priori.{1 Instead, he wanted to 
point his readers in the right direction of arete ethike (moral excel-
lence). The products of ethical science (e.g., the Nicomachean 
Ethics) are the products of techne; as such, they fail to capture the 
heuristic aspect of phronesis.1* It is just this heuristic d imension 
of ethical learning that evades methodological instruction as prac-
ticed by the geometer and mathematician. 
Ethical knowledge, as the process of phronesis, is gained by 
experience. But this is not as simple as going out and listening to 
the opinion of the majority, or behaving according to socially ac-
cepted norms. The experience necessary for phronesis is an open-
ing up towards the truth of one ' s experience, a compor tment to-
wards letting things appear as they are. This "openness" is what 
Gadamer calls the "art of quest ioning." 1 9 W e ask quest ions of oth-
ers because the activity that we are engaged in, phronesis, has as 
its goal understanding. W e preserve our openness when we can 
persistently ask the right questions. Hence, experience is not so 
much an empirical science as it is an orientation, one that permits 
being "radically open and ready for new experiences and capable 
of learning from them." 2 0 The orientation is not a personal pre-
rogative to be liberal in one ' s views, though this is a possibility of 
its effects; it is what Heidegger would call a way that Dasein can 
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"be-in-the world." Aristotle saw the inability to teach ethics and 
mathematics in the same way as a reflection of the immaturi ty of 
s tudents ' youth. They have not lived long enough to become "cul -
tured," a process that Gadamer (following Hegel) calls Bildung. 
Gadamer takes this Aristotelian point about the limits of knowl-
edge and brings it into the realm of Heideggerian ontology, where 
individuals ' ways of being dictate their ways of understanding the 
world. Our practical understanding arrives at "knowledge [that] 
does not have the rank of episteme understood as a pure objective 
cognition detached from the kind of human beings which we are ." 2 1 
The orientation is dialectical in that it has a "negat ive e lement" , 
one that "springs from the knowledge of not knowing" in the "spirit 
of Socrates." 2 2 W e are engaged in phronesis whenever we encounter 
the world in its particularity and attempt to understand its truth. 
Phronesis resists method, and it is a process in which we are 
always already engaged. Gadamer argues that interpretation is simi-
lar. Brice Wachterhauser writes that "phronesis is paradigmatic 
for interpretation, according to Gadamer , because it involves a 
constant movement between a universal meaning-claim and par-
ticular c i rcumstances ." 2 3 Aristotle knew that no amount of teach-
ing would take his students to the " t ru th" about the virtuous life, 
not because he did not know what it was, but because it was al-
ways changing and based upon circumstance: Wachterhauser notes 
that the "ethical universal itself fis] somewhat inexact ." 2 4 What 
makes this account of phronesis "paradigmat ic" for interpretation 
is that when we interpret a text—in the loose Gadamerian sense of 
anything that contains a richness of meaning to be drawn o u t — w e 
are not trying to get at its fixed "essence ." Indeed, fixed essences 
cannot be the objects of our investigation because a text changes 
over time with each new valid interpretation. Wachterhauser writes, 
"The being of the universal is increased in application to a particu-
lar set of c i rcumstances because its meaning becomes , in prin-
ciple, fuller, more complete with each new genuinely defensible 
application of i t . " 2 5 Insofar as Gadamer is still a Platonist, he holds 
that the "essence" of the text, while not static, exists and under-
goes a process of increase in being with each new interpretation. 
This increase is not a change perse, but an "adding to . " The richer 
the text, the more infinitely expandable it becomes through inter-
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pretation. N o distinction appears between epistemology and meta-
physics in Gadamer ' s philosophy, such that we might object that 
the " increase" going on is merely an increase of our knowledge 
about a universal. Instead, the ontological " increase" is symbiotic 
with our knowledge of the text in question. 
The classical reading of Plato is already at odds with Gadamer ' s 
reading; it would never accept the idea that Forms undergo an in-
crease in being because this conflicts with their "eternal i ty ." How-
ever, Gadamer makes an even more radical claim: the increase in 
being through interpretation does take into consideration interpret-
ers and their histories. Phronesis not only "cap tures" the meta-
physical operations of interpretation, but also the problem of the 
effect of the subject 's history on experience that troubled Husserl 
and Heidegger. The bearing of a text on my own circumstances 
Gadamer calls "application." The Forms (in G a d a m e r ' s account) 
are not seen as removed from the circumstances of language, ex-
perience, and the situation of the subject. W e not only take into 
our interpretation our Wirkungsgeschichte ("history of effects") 
which includes our cultural heritage, our education, e tc . , but our 
doing so is necessary for adequate interpretation. 
When one interprets a text, a "fusion of hor izons" occurs in 
which a personal history interacts with a text to derive a meaning, 
a common act of participation that affects and defines both it and 
oneself. 2 6 Just as in ordinary parlance a horizon is the limit of what 
one is able to see, the "hor izon" of interpreters or a text is their 
particular situatedness. Individuals' abilities to " s e e " are based upon 
their finite exper iences and histories, and the textual hor izon 
projects from the finiteness of its physical aspect (the words on the 
page, for example) . When the fusion occurs in proper interpreta-
tion, all horizons involved "expand"; interpreters add understand-
ing of the text to their history of effects, and the text undergoes an 
increase in being, or a growth in the ways in which it can be said to 
mean something. Wachterhauser writes, "Only by engaging in this 
mediation [application] can I begin to grasp these realities them-
selves as they really are, i.e., as realities whose meanings are con-
nected to our language and experience in essential ways and which 
evolve over t ime in constant d ia logue ." 2 7 This "d ia logue" is be-
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tween myself, authors and their experiences, and texts, where all 
of these horizons merge and participate in the Form of the text. 
Part III: Philosophy, Poetry, and Methexis 
How does philosophical hermeneutics as described by Gadamer 
and phronesis that is integral to it relate to Pla to ' s discussion of 
the poets? If we consider that Plato thought of dialectic as the way 
to do philosophy, then the answer is clear. For what is dialectic 
except dialogue, a series of questions and answers among inter-
locutors who have to engage in properly pedagogical mimesis to 
achieve phronesisl Dialect ic arises as a form of par t ic ipat ion 
(methexis) among speakers, in the same sense in which particulars 
participate in a Form. As each new interpretation of a text increases 
its being, each new instantiation of a particular increases the being 
of the Form to which it corresponds. Similarly, the respective per-
sons engaged in dialogue achieve an increase in their Being by 
participation, as I intimated earlier. 
I described the properly pedagogical mimesis as a kind of invi-
tation that Gadamer describes as openness, which is essential to 
dialogue and to methexis. Gadamer explicates openness in this way: 
But this openness is, in the end, not there only for 
the person from whom we wish to be told some-
thing; rather whoever in general allows something 
to be told to him is, in a fundamental way, open. 
Without such an openness to one another there is 
no genuine human bond . 2 8 
Part of this openness consists in each participant being open to 
surprise; each must be open to the risk of being wrong. Husserl 
would have objected to this claim, for the whole idea of Husserlian 
phenomenology was to arrive at certain knowledge of the eidetic 
features of our experiences. Gadamer , on the other hand, knows 
that we carry with us pre-conceived commitments (ontological and 
otherwise) in our dealings with others and with texts that can lead 
us into error, and rather than try to escape from this fact, as Husserl 
did, Gadamer says that we should instead bring that into the play 
of interpretation.^ This uncertainty is everywhere apparent in the 
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writings of Plato. Socrates over and over again qualifies his dia-
lectical engagements by saying that he is "omit t ing m u c h , " even if 
he does not quite know what he is leaving ou t . 3 0 And in P la to ' s 
Apology Socrates claimed that his wisdom lay in the fact that he 
knew that he did not know. 3 1 W e will never escape our own opin-
ions, but we can allow ourselves the risk of being wrong. 
Aristotle could not tell his pupils the exact way to a virtuous 
life for these same reasons. The virtuous life is, among other things, 
playful engagement with others, bouncing interpretations off one 
another in methexis, and being open to whatever might c o m e out 
of such games . What does come out of these e lements of the virtu-
ous life is essentially negative, in that we destroy what was previ-
ously thought to be " typical" or a correct general izat ion. 3 2 The 
destruction of these generalizations took place over and over again 
in the early Platonic dialogues, as Socrates proved that Euthyphro 
did not know what piety is, Meno did not know what virtue is, and 
so on. The playful Socratic dialectic is the solution to the Aristote-
lian problem of ethical knowledge, for Socrates knew that virtue is 
not taught by teachers , 3 3 but arrived at through play. 
Notice that this playfulness is not a random "playing at" in 
which anything goes, nor is truth a function of whatever set of 
metaphors we decide to incorporate as rules in our play, as the 
popular stereotype of postmodern thought holds. . Play is often very 
serious because it is an exploration of truth, yet truth cannot ap-
pear if we do not allow ourselves to be open to it. The negative 
element of play creates a clearing in which truth can appear, and 
its constant interaction back and forth adapts itself to the increase 
in being that universals undergo. Wachterhauser observes: 
When , however , a person of practical w i sdom 
[phronesis] revises a universal ethical norm in light 
of new circumstances, this does not show that the 
identity of the universal itself has simply changed, 
but rather it has been "appl ied" in a new way to 
new circumstances. This does not imply that we 
are now dealing with a new and different univer-
sal; it shows instead the possibilities of meaning 
inherent in the universal itself. 3 4 
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Gadamer and Wachterhauser are not claiming that everything is 
subjective and that the world lacks ethical norms, but rather that 
those norms are living, growing things. 
The Nicomachean Ethics is a set of general guidelines that 
shows us how to participate in phronesis the way Socrates would. 
Plato shared this a t t i tude. 3 5 By having Socrates claim that he "did 
not k n o w " at the same time as he engaged in endless debate in the 
dialogues and the Republic, he was pointing beyond what the ac-
tual dialogues "sa id" and instead extended an invitation to partici-
pate in them. "In the process of recapitulation and repetition, in 
the repeated inducement to participate in the movement of dialec-
tical discourse," writes Col tman, "the dialogues perform their ethi-
cal and pedagogical t ask—a task carried out via a maieut ic or 
(re)productive mimesis"™ In writing the dialogues Plato recog-
nized this positive mode of mimesis; furthermore, other poets could 
also recognize it and actually practice virtue rather than endanger 
it. 
An objection needs to be addressed regarding phronesis in our 
discussion thus far. Many scholars regard the Greek concept of 
phronesis as not free from ambiguity. T o put the objection more 
exactly, some believe Aristotle and Plato mean different things by 
phronesis. Gadamer himself acknowledges that Aristotle was the 
first to separate the ideas of sophia and phronesis and elaborate on 
their distinction. In separating these ideas, Aristotle put forward 
the idea of ethics as a discipline distinct from metaphysics . Be-
yond the criticism that these conceptual distinctions simply were 
not there for Plato, there is also the fact that Aristotle heavily criti-
cized Plato for holding a doctrine that, in subsuming practical un-
der theoretical wisdom, tends towards "an empty genera l i ty ." 3 7 
This conceptual confusion leads to an even greater misunders tand-
ing of the nature and pursuit of the Good . H o w can we treat 
phronesis as an Aristotelian concept with Platonic implications if 
this disagreement is present? 
The full answer to this problem must await the more complete 
discussion of my conclusion. For now, however , consider what 
Gadamer has called the "Platonic-Aristotelian unitary effect ." 3 8 
This "effect" arises when we compare what Aristotle said and what 
Plato did. Aristotle, in such passages of the Nicomachaen Ethics 
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as we have considered previously, held that insofar as ethics is 
regarded as a "sc ience" it is concerned with experience gained by 
interaction with the world; it is a comportment that engages the 
world to extract its truths. I argue that Plato, in writing the dia-
logues—especially the early ones—shows us precisely how this is 
done in the actions of Socrates. Socrates engages the world of people 
who claim to know, and he becomes involved in conversat ion with 
them. He asks hard questions, questions that initially appear easy 
and a matter of empirical finding, such as "Wha t is j u s t i ce?" and 
"Wha t is p ie ty?" In the course of dialectic we discover that such 
truths of the world are not easy to find, but we do not fault Socrates 
for not finding them. W e bracket the issue of theoretical wisdom, 
and instead Plato draws us into the folds of practical wisdom, the 
activity of what is to be done. If we separate what Socrates discov-
ered to be the case from how he went about discovering it, the 
Aristotelian distinctions appear in a more artful and rhetorically 
richer form. Zdravko Planinc writes, 
When the descriptions of Socrates ' phronesis in 
Pla to ' s dialogues are compared with the dist inc-
tions made in Aristot le 's ethical writings between 
theoretical, practical, and technical knowledge, the 
similarity between the Socratic aspiration to the 
good and Aristotelian phronesis is ev ident . 3 9 
The "effect" thus achieved in taking a more hermeneutic view of 
Plato and Aristotle, in addition to the merely philosophical or philo-
logical, places the idea of phronesis on firm ground that al lows for 
defense of the poets. 
Part IV: Plato the Master Poet 
James Carse has observed that Plato wanted the poets to serve 
a role in the polis that stems from their ability to deceive the citi-
zenry: 
The danger of poets, for Plato, is that they can 
imitate so well that it is difficult to see what is 
true and what is merely invented. Since reality 
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cannot be invented, but only discovered through 
the existence of reason—according to Plato—all 
poets must be put into the service of reason. The 
poets are to surround the citizens of the Republic 
with art as will "lead them unawares from child-
hood to love of, resemblance to, and harmony with, 
the beauty of reason." 
The use of the word ' unawares ' shows Pla to ' s in-
tention to keep the metaphysical veil intact. Those 
who are being led to reason cannot be aware of it. 
They must be led to it without choosing it. Plato 
asks his poets not to create, but to deceive (§49). 
40 
Carse represents a typical reading of Plato. After all, it was Plato 
who had Socrates banter on and on about what is al lowed for poets 
to say and what should be censored. Furthermore, if a foreigner 
were to enter the polis and begin to speak of the things reason has 
told us to forbid, we shall "tell him there is no one like him in the 
city and that it isn ' t lawful for there to b e " (Republic, III, 398a) . 
Reason, on this reading of Plato, must counteract the violence done 
by the false virtue taught by poets who disguise these teachings. 
Poets are to be employed in this grand scheme. 
T o be sure, Carse thinks that this sort of deception is exploita-
tion of the poets at its worst. Poets do not "display their art so as to 
make it appear real; they display the real in a way that reveals it to 
be ar t ." 4 1 There cannot be anything more despicable than to ask 
(indeed, to command) the poets to do something against their na-
ture in order to fulfil an agenda; in other words , to ask them to 
deceive rather than to display. Deception of this kind is achieved 
by submitting others to the authority of the text; that is, to engage 
in aesthetic mimesis. While Carse is right when he says that poets 
do display the real in a way that reveals it to be art, he is wrong in 
his negative assessment of what Plato was trying to accomplish , 
and in saying that it does not fit with the Pla to ' s overall way of 
thinking. P la to ' s dominant concern for advocating censorship of 
the poets lay in the deeper purpose of removing the harmful ef-
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fects of aesthetic mimesis. Plato objected to the using the poets for 
a political purpose; he did not endorse that manipulat ion as Carse 
charges. T o see that Plato and Carse may in fact be on the same 
side on this issue, and how Plato avoids apparent hypocrisy, con-
sider what Gadamer says about art, remember ing that poetry is 
one of its many forms. 
Like Carse, Gadamer sensed an overriding playfulness in art. 
Mimesis has an important role in dialogue, just as it does in art: 
" Inasmuch as nature is without purpose and intention, jus t as it is 
without exertion, it is a constantly self-renewing play, and can there-
fore appear as a model for ar t ." 4 2 What we are playing, according 
to Gadamer , is a game, one that has no end (Carse calls games of 
this sort, appropriately enough, "infinite games") . What makes such 
games "infinite" is that they are never finished, just as Being is 
never finished. Being can always be added-to, expanded and en-
larged. As activities of properly pedagogical mimesis, infinite games 
are not a show for an audience, though they may inadvertently 
attract one. Instead, they are invitations to play, to observe the art 
and to participate in it by interpreting it. " Indeed," writes Gadamer , 
"contests are in danger of losing their real play character precisely 
by becoming shows . " 4 3 Art is a never-ending game that requires 
the interaction of players who do not act out a script but rather 
engage each other with openness. 
What are the rules of this game, and what is its goal? How d o 
we decide who has won? Unlike other ("finite") games , art has no 
winner and no specific goal. The rules are set by players during the 
course of play, and can be changed. 4 4 This account may overwork 
the play metaphor. An alternative is to look at art from a herme-
neutic standpoint. A work of art is a text, one we are a lways al-
ready interpreting when we are in its presence. When we engage 
the text, that is, behold the art and enter the game , we interact with 
a variety of "players ." These players include the artist, the person 
interpreting the text, the whole ensemble of people who have con-
structed their own interpretations of the work, and so on. This is 
the "fusion of hor izons" Gadamer refers to, a sort of gathering on 
the playing field of all the participants in the game of art. The 
players remain distinct only in their various Wirkungsgeschichte, 
but even this distinction they surrender when the play begins , be-
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cause it is added to in the progression of play. Similarly, I add to 
the being of the text as well, just as any player adds their play to a 
game to make it what it is. Thinking about baseball is also think-
ing about the players who have added to it, the Babe Ruths and 
Mickey Mant les of the game. 
Just as baseball is transformed (both in terms of rules of play 
and style) and is played differently as time goes on and players are 
added, a work of art is only fully (but not finally) realized each 
time it is interpreted; that is, the fullness of its being is only to be 
had by adding to it. Gadamer writes, 
Play is structure—this means that despite its de -
pendency on being played it is a meaningful whole 
which can be repeatedly presented as such and the 
significance of which can be understood. But struc-
ture is also play, because—despi te this theoreti-
cal unity—it achieves its full being only each t ime 
it is p layed. 4 5 
Gadamer is making a crucial distinction that requires careful no-
tice. A work of art has a unity that can be taken up and inteipreted; 
otherwise, it would make no sense to refer to it or anything else as 
a " text ." However , the non-theoretical unity of full being exists 
only insofar as it is continually brought back into play and added 
to. If the Mona Lisa were lost along with all of its replications and 
no one ever saw it again, it would not cease to be. However , it 
would be effectively "s tunted" in that it would cease to be added 
to; it would be a painting on canvass now lost and not art. A simi-
lar effect would be achieved if we simply ignored it as a work of 
art. The emphasis here is on the creation of and interaction with 
art, the activity and play that goes along with engaging a work in 
dialogue. Since there is no definitive interpretation of the Mona 
Lisa, or a "stopping point" for its increase in being, there is a strong 
intuition that the Mona Lisa exists only as a work in progress , an 
object in flux or a Form that is dependent upon its continual re-
interpretation. When discussing the painting itself, it is more ac-
curate to describe the talking going on as the Mona Lisa rather 
than what is said or the colors on canvas in front of us. The only 
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way for it to survive is through re-creation, where "every repeti-
tion is as original as the work itself." 4 6 
Here is the second critical distinction to be made in construct-
ing my defense of the poets. The first was the distinction between 
aesthetic and properly pedagogical mimesis. The second is the dif-
ference between poiesis (creating) versus poiema (what is created). 
True art is not the paint on canvas but the ongoing recreation of the 
original act of genius; the true text is not the container of meaning 
but the dialogue in which I engage; the true game of baseball is not 
a summary of its rules or a compilation of its historical games 
played at certain t imes and places, but the playing of it by players. 
The poiema is useful only insofar as it points beyond itself and 
serves as an invitation to play, to continue the infinite game of 
poiesis. P la to ' s Republic, his written work that has Socrates rec-
ommend the removal of imitators and the bending of the poets to 
the dictates of reason, is a poiema that calls attention to something 
beyond itself. What it calls attention to is what it is doing, not what 
it says. Like Pla to ' s dialogues, it is a demonstrat ion of what the 
dictates of reason are: not a set of rigid rules to be discovered by 
the elect and enforced upon the poets and distributed to the masses 
through deception, but the activity of dialectic, the infinite dia-
logue whose goal is not "getting it r ight" in some final sense but 
getting it to continue. 
The Republic, then, is itself a work of art, of poetry or poiema 
that points beyond itself by displaying how reason is cultivated. 
Deception of the citizens by poets is merely a suggestion, an ex-
plored possibility that enters into the dialogue and is tested for 
consistency and completeness, two Gadamerian criteria for valid 
interpretation. The objection arises: how can these arguments be 
merely suggestions if Plato goes to great lengths to defend this 
position? The answer is simple: Plato is not arguing "for" the posi-
tion as much as he is inviting us to put it on trial. W h y else would 
he make the concession of Book X, inviting us to defend the poets 
and argue for their inclusion in the polis? The reason is not that 
Plato particularly liked or admired the poets, al though he probably 
did. Nor is it that Plato is acting out of philosophical snobbery, 
issuing a challenge meant to intimidate his audience into accept-
ing his position rather than trying to argue against it. W e must take 
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Plato at his word here, because his invitation to defend the poets is 
what lies behind the poiema: a proposal for the audience to be-
come players and to instantiate the display of poiesis. This device 
is most effective in combat ing what Carse and Plato both fear: 
deception. Only when we "lose ourselves to the g a m e " as Gadamer 
puts it by becoming the poetry can we become immunized against 
its being used as a virus against u s . 4 7 Therefore, poetry cannot , 
properly speaking, be "uti l ized" at all a^ua poiesis. Only its ab-
straction, the poiema, can be mobilized against us. 
Any other encounters with poetry risk its abuse. Carse calls 
ideas abstracted from a thinker "metaphys ics" in a pejorative sense 
of the term. 4 " Metaphysics is calling attention to the work of a 
thinker; it is the aesthetic mimesis described earlier. This bad side 
of metaphysics that potentially affects all poetry is what Plato warns 
against. In a way, he must also warn us against the Republic itself. 
Gadamer observes 
Thus the poetry of Plato 's dialogues is certainly 
not the model for that poetry which would be al-
lowed in the ideal state. But it is the real poetry 
which is able to say what is educational in actual 
political life. And just as poetry in the ideal state 
must fend off aesthetic misinterpretations of its 
mimesis , Pla to ' s dialogical poetry must resist any 
aesthetic misinterpretat ion. 4 9 
The proper role of poetry is not to instruct by telling, because as 
Socrates found out, poets do not know anyth ing . 5 0 Rather, it is to 
get others involved in conversation and communi ty . 
This point about poiesis and poiema contains the final and great-
est bit of irony that smiles through the genius of Plato. In asking 
the question in Book X, and in having Socrates place the gauntlet 
at our feet, Plato has simultaneously issued a chal lenge, an invita-
tion, and the answer to that challenge. Defending poets is accom-
plished by defending what they do , and the best way to do that is to 
create poetry ourselves, which is precisely what Plato always did. 
Carse himself suspected Plato of such cleverness: 
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W e must remind ourselves, to be sure, that Plato 
himself was an artist, a poietes...wc cannot help 
but think that behind the rational metaphysician, 
phi losophy 's great Master Player, stood Plato the 
poet, fully aware that the entire opus was an act of 
play, an invitation to readers not to reproduce the 
truth but to take his inventions into their own play, 
establishing the continuity of his art by changing 
it (§49). 
The playing back and forth, the dialogue that changes and sur-
prises and delights, these are just the things that we d o to reach the 
Good, the "unity of what is unitary" as Gadamer says. "Uni ty" 
here has a double meaning: in the context of hermeneut ics , it de-
scribes valid interpretation that does not overlook crucial aspects 
of the text. In a broader sense, "uni ty" is the principle that unites, 
the methexis that brings us together in dialogue so that interpreta-
tion is possible at all, so that poetry and creation are possible at all. 
W e must talk about art and philosophy in close proximity to one 
another because of their mutual concern for truth, which is as 
Gadamer shows us located in the activity of art. Indeed, the ques-
tions of philosophy "never stray far from the topic of ar t" and of-
ten find their answers in it . 5 1 As art, poetry initiates the conversa-
tion that philosophy takes up and makes its own. 
The idea of the previous section was that the playfulness of 
poetry and dialogue contains within it a seed of seriousness that 
prevents it from being " m e r e " play. This idea reaches full fruition 
in light of what is now concluded about P la to ' s work. Gadamer 
tells us that 
Precisely because of the seriousness of his pur-
pose, Plato gives his mimesis the levity of a jocu-
lar play. Insofar as his dialogues are to portray 
philosophizing in order to compel us to philoso-
phize, they shroud all of what they say in the am-
biguous twilight of irony. And in this way Plato is 
able to escape the trap of the ever so vulnerable 
written work, which cannot come to its own de -
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fense, and to create a truly philosophical poetry 
which points beyond itself to what is of real con-
sequence. His dialogues are nothing more than 
playful allusions which say something only to him 
w h o finds meanings beyond what is express ly 
stated in them and allows these meanings to take 
effect within h im. 5 2 
This is why poetry is beneficial to human life. Plato, as master 
philosopher, posed question after question in pursuit of the truth; 
as a poet of genius , he extended an invitation to reply and to jo in in 
the wonder of infinite play. 
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